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Here to stay 
Special advisers (SpAds) have long been a feature of British government. Precisely how long depends 
on whether one is concerned with the formal position, in which case one would date the institution back 
to the 1970s, or whether one is concerned with the general practice of outsiders giving advice to office-
holders, in which case one could go back in history as far as one liked, certainly as far back as the 
sixteenth century (Blick 2004 chapter 2; Gay 2000; 2010).  Either way, the election of the Blair 
administration in 1997 is likely to be considered a significant turning point in the career of the 
institution of the special adviser.  Most obviously, the number of special advisers nearly doubled 
overnight from 38 under John Major to 72 under Blair and has remained high since.  Yet the most 
important change under the Labour government after 1997 was the routinization of the position in 
British politics: a range of characteristics that had been occasionally noticeable before 1997 became 
established as enduring, or at least longer-lasting, features of British political life.  Special adviser 
contracts were regularised and standardised, service as a SpAd became an important mainstream path to 
senior political office, their influence was not limited to whispering in the ears of ministers but having a 
direct role in policy making and implementation in government, and two of them were even given 
powers to issue direct commands to civil servants.   Advisers could be public figures in their own right 
and they weathered some very severe controversies that damaged the careers of several advisers, 
ministers and civil servants but left the institution of special adviser itself largely unscathed (see, for 
example, Select Committee on Public Administration 2002).   That the Conservative-Liberal coalition 
appointed at least as many advisers as the outgoing Labour government, despite David Cameron's 
declaration that he would end the "control freakery" of the special advisers system as it had developed 
under new Labour, suggests that SpAds might here to stay.  In the biggest “adviser” scandal in the early 
Cameron government, the fact that the person concerned, Adam Werrity did not have the legitimacy 
that comes with the official status of a special adviser, contributed to the resignation of the Secretary of 
State for Defence in 2011. 
 
That SpAds have come to exert a significant impact on decision making in Whitehall is widely 
accepted. In the 1980s comedy Yes Minister the hapless special adviser was a minor figure easily 
manoeuvred to the sidelines in episode one and occasionally manipulated by the canny senior civil 
servants thereafter.  In The Thick of It some twenty-five years later, the position is reversed: minister-
adviser nexus is the focus of decision making in government departments and the only civil servants 
that play any role at all, albeit minor parts, are the press officers and not the permanent secretaries.  The 
prism of BBC comedy cannot be taken as conclusive proof of change.  Contemporary academic 
accounts of policy making in Whitehall would now be considered incomplete without some mention of 
the role of special advisers (Rhodes 2009); less than twenty years ago they were unlikely even to be 
mentioned in them (Dowding 1995; Pyper 1995).  We know lots about the non-routine activities of 
SpAds from the scandals that hit the head. Yet we do not know much about the more routine 
contribution of SpAds to contemporary life in Whitehall.  The aim of this note is to explore the 
evidence provided by a small empirical study of advisers to Labour ministers between 1997 and 2010 
(consisting of a survey of 125 advisers and interviews with 26). 
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Asessing SpAd roles 
Political appointees in government organizations are not new or unique to the UK.  While the powers, 
duties and expectations associated with the role of a political appointee vary significantly from one 
jurisdiction to another, one can detect three broad, not mutually exclusive, images in the academic 
literature of the role of appointed advisers in executive government that appear relevant to UK SpAds. 
There is the political commissar role, serving as the eyes, ears and mouth of the politician that appoints 
them in an executive organization which is hard for him or her to control.  This, for example, is the role 
of the member of the French cabinet set out in Suleiman’s (1975) work on French bureaucracy (see also 
Eymeri-Douzans 2008).  A second role is that of the political fixer: the person who does political jobs 
for the politician that civil servants could not do -- dealing directly with party colleagues, legislators, 
writing political speeches.  These broad types1 are expressed here as extremes. The political commissar 
role can be relatively unobtrusive. In their commissar role advisers need not necessarily be inclined or 
able to give orders: speaking for the minister can mean indicating to a civil servant what the minister 
might think of a proposal which is at least as likely to be welcomed as condemned by civil servants 
developing a policy. The essence of the commissar is that she or he is integrated in the policy making 
structure within the ministry or agency.  The political fixer is not.  Fixers do jobs that civil servants 
cannot do, or cannot do easily or well.  Fixers can also provide services welcome to civil servants, 
including using political contacts and networks to find out what parts of legislation they are developing 
are likely to cause problems in the legislature or to smoothe the passage of interministerial negotiations. 
 
Of course, defining roles as commissars or fixers does not fully describe what political appointees do in 
much detail -- much depends on the people appointed (e.g. whether they are outsiders, insiders,  
partisans, policy wonks) and how they behave (e.g. whether they remain party loyalists or "go native", 
confront officials).  However, our knowledge of the impact of SpAds is rather unsystematic.  The good 
studies of their role that we have (Blick 2004, Gay 2000) have tended to focus on some of the more 
prominent SpAds and on the publicly documented aspects of their roles, such as Jo Moore or Damian 
McBride.  We still need more evidence to understand their role in the everyday operation of 
government.   
 
There will be no prizes for guessing, even on the basis of what we already know,  that SpAds can serve 
both as commissars and fixers, but what is the relative weight given to these roles and how do they  
affect the balance of power at the top of government ministries where others, notably civil servants but 
also junior ministers, might have been expected to carry out these roles in the past? In spring 2011 we 
conducted a small survey, supplemented by interviews, of former Labour special advisers to which we 
received 125 replies2.  The questionnaire was of necessity brief.  The study looks only at the 
perceptions of SpAds and not the people with whom they interact such as ministers, Members of 
Parliament, civil servants, journalists, party officials and interest group representatives. In consequence 
our evidence about the role of special advisers is the role as seen from their perspective. 
 
We know that political advisers are overwhelmingly party loyalists.  Indeed, most SpAds answering our 
                                                
1  A third role is that of the political trustee, who serves as someone to exercise executive 
leadership in their own right, not directly working with the person appointing him or her, but 
believed to be broadly sympathetic or supportive of their appointer.  Many top US political 
executives would fall into this category (see Heclo 1977), it is not discussed here as SpAds have no 
direct executive authority.  
2  A list of Special Advisers from 1997 to 2010 was drawn up using press reports,  Dods 
Parliamentary Companion and the Civil Service Yearbook. This yielded an initial list of 292.  Of these we 
found contact details for 212.  125 valid responses were received to a questionnaire administered online 
using Bristol Online Surveys software  between February and March 2011, a response rate of 59 per cent. 
 
 3 
questionnaire (79 per cent, N=125) had been party members for five or more years before they were 
appointed, a further 15 per cent were members for less than five years and only 6 per cent were not 
members of the party. The central question in distinguishing between commissar and fixer roles is the 
degree to which the adviser performs roles at the top of Whitehall that are distinct from the traditional 
Whitehall policy advisory roles. 
 
The  policy activities  of SpAds 
How far are commissar and fixer roles reflected in the everyday activity of SpAds?  Two key 
commissar-type activities are those of the policy "wonk" and the policy "enforcer".  The wonk provides 
advice on how policies should be developed; the kind that one might otherwise have expected civil 
servants to have provided.  As Blick (2004: 253-4) suggests, when planning for government before 
1997 senior Labour strategists argued that the Prime Minister "has to get personal control of the central 
government machine and drive it hard in the knowledge that if the government does not run the 
machine the machine will run the government" and likewise departmental ministers should recruit 
politically committed advisers "who can make a serious contribution to the issues in hand and are able 
to work closely with departmental officials in developing policy ". The "enforcer" makes sure that these 
policies are delivered. As Blick (2004: 254) put it they would be able to "work on the implementation 
of policies which are central to the new Labour strategy”.  Given the prominence of "delivery" in the 
Blair administration one might expect this to be an especially significant task of advisers. These 
activities can be distinguished from communication activities associated with dealing with the media, 
groups, MPs and other politicians, whether to "spin" the government's message to a wider public, to get 
a wider understanding of political and public reaction to government proposals and actions or to  help 
gain wider political support for government policies. 
 
Table 1 Amount of time spent on different kinds of adviser functions3 
   All or most of time                   Some time                     Little or no time 
 
Communications 63 31 13 
Policy design 59 25 23 
Delivery 36 26 45 
 
N=107, multiple responses possible 
 
We asked special advisers how much time they spent helping design policies, delivering policies and 
communicating with others about the government's policies.  New  Labour’s special advisers reported 
that they did all three of these things (Table 1).   Communication, the most distinctive form of  fixer 
activity, occupied most of the time of special advisers, 63 or 59 per cent spent all or most of their time 
on it and only 12 per cent only spent little or no time on it.  Yet communicating occupied only 
marginally more of special advisers' time than policy design (59 or 55 per cent spending a lot or time on 
it against 23 or 21 per cent little or no time). Only policy delivery and implementation appeared to be a 
major task for a minority of special advisers (36 or 34 per cent) although the majority did this kind of 
work at least some of the time (45 or 42 per cent did it rarely or never).  While activities associated with 
the fixer appear the most important, when added together, activities associated with a commissar role -- 
wonk and enforcer – appear when added together to be at least as, if not more, important.  
 
The degree of integration of SpAds into the Departmental policy making structure, characteristic of a 
commissar role, rather than semi-detached fixers can be seen in the frequency of contacts with key 
                                                
3  The wording was Design, "Helping design policies"; Communications, "Communicating 
with others, including the media, interest groups and MPs, about the work of the Department" and 
Delivery "Ensuring the delivery or implementation of policies" 
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groups with whom they might be expected to interact in the policy process.  We asked whether contacts 
tended to be daily, once a week or more or less frequent.  Table 2 sets out the frequencies of the key 
groups involved in policy making about which we asked.  The clear predominance of contact with 
middle ranking  and junior civil servants within the department might reflect in part the fact that they 
work alongside each other in all roles -- not least because many have their own civil servant 
administrative assistants and were generally located in their minister's Private Office, the group of civil 
servants that arranges the minister's diary as well as serving as the immediate point of contact for civil 
servants and others wishing to contact the minister (see Rhodes 2010).  As one  SpAd put it, "it was 
almost like [we] were … part of the Minister’s Private Office".  Even in writing speeches the SpAds we 
spoke to had to deal directly with civil servants, often junior civil servants who knew the details of 
policies and policy proposals.   
 
Although this was not included in the questionnaire, the interviews suggested that SpAd contact with 
Senior Civil Servants, especially Permanent Secretaries, was less frequent than with other officials 
junior to them.  One suggested that “the most effective relationships were formed with civil servants 
who were one rung below the most senior level, as they were more involved in the details of policy, and 
had more time to develop a relationship” with advisers, another suggested “generally SpAds don’t like 
to have much contact with [Permanent Secretaries] because normally that would be an indication that 
there’s a problem" as SpAds would be expected to resolve potential difficulties before  they get passed 
up the administrative hierarchy that far.  This is not to suggest that SpAds had no contact with top 
officials.  Physical proximity and working with the minister often  meant that they would meet 
frequently.  As one put it  "the Permanent Secretary’s office was next to mine so I would see him daily, 
although we rarely had formal meetings".  However few in the interview stressed the top civil servants 
as their main contact with the civil service. 
 
Dealing with civil servants from their own departments, was clearly the most frequent of their contacts 
and is more characteristic of commissar than fixer roles.  However, daily contacts characteristic of 
“fixer” roles, above all with SpAds from other departments and Members of Parliament, were also 
strongly represented in the answers to our questions about frequency of contacts.  This suggests a 
significant portion of SpAd time is spent helping to square government policy intentions with fellow 
party supporters in government and parliament. 
 
Table 2  Contacts of Special Advisers  
            Daily     At least weekly 
Civil servants below the Senior Civil Service level 73 91 
Junior Ministers from your own Department 47 84 
Special Advisers from other Departments 41 83 
Members of Parliament 31 74 
Representatives from interest groups (including unions) 17 61 
Ministers (including Junior Ministers) from other Departments 13 48 




Do SpAds fall into neat categories of wonk, enforcer and fixer? The answer appears to be largely “no”.  
No SpAd reported one thing as making up “all or almost all of my work” and having “little or none of 
my work” occupied by anything else. Nevertheless, a significant number of SpAds tended to 
concentrate on one role: a slight minority (51 out of  107  or 48 per cent) tended to concentrate their 
efforts on one of these three roles (i.e. replying that it made "a large part of my work" or more) and 
being less taken up by one or both of the other two.  Communication (27/51) was the most common 
specialism among these “specialists”, followed by policy (21/51) and only 3/51 specialised in delivery. 
A further 41 (37 per cent) spent “all or most of their time” on two of these functions and the remainder 
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(16 or 15 per cent) divided their time more or less evenly between the three functions with no one or 
two of them occupying all or most of their time.  
 
Some of the SpAds we spoke to suggested that that specialisation in a particular type of work was a 
“luxury” that could only be afforded by ministers with larger numbers of SpAds.  One of them, for 
example, suggested that ministers who for the most part  only had two SpAds  “are looking for people 
who can do both policy and press work”.  However, the survey offers little support for this argument. 
SpAds working in the Treasury or for Number 10, with larger numbers of advisers than other 
departments and accounting for a third of our respondents, did not appear to be noticeably more likely 
to emphasise a single role than those working for Secretaries of State.  The handful of SpAds (n=14) 
who did not work in conventional departmental SpAd positions ( i.e. did not work directly under 
Secretaries of State, Prime Ministers and Chancellors of the Exchequer but under other kinds of 
political leaders such as Ministers of  State or Leaders of the House) were less likely to specialise. 
However,  the numbers are too small to be statistically significant. 
 
The combination of such commissar and fixer roles thus appears to be pretty even, with only the 
enforcement side of the commissar role being clearly minor. Moreover, both roles tend to be combined 
in the same adviser, with some tending to concentrate somewhat more or less on one role rather than the 
other.  
 
Friction at the top? 
The policy wonk  activity of the commissar, which a clear majority of SpAds fill to some degree or 
other,  might be expected to generate friction with other key figures who have traditionally dominated 
the higher reaches of  the ministerial policy making system, including above all civil servants. SpAds 
might have been expected to have displaced them.  Moreover, SpAds do not always stick with “the 
politics” of a proposal and leave the “technical” parts to civil servants. As one put it in an interview: “I 
would not think it was my job to manage the development of a policy, it was my job to develop the 
management of that policy into a piece of politics. … I didn’t have time to say ‘I want to develop a 
policy all the way through’. …[A]  policy is ten people working for a month on something and there’s 
no way I could have done that”. However others considered their role as wider than simply the 
“politics”.  Several pointed to the detailed aspects of policy development they became involved in.  For 
example, one said that a good SpAd “figures out that the civil service jump to the tune of the red box 
[which contain submissions and proposals for ministerial approval that ministers typically work on at 
home], and that you must work closely with those civil servants who put stuff into the minister’s box 
every night”. Some pointed to the difficulty of separating “the politics” from policy development.  A 
special adviser from the Home Office argued 
My explanation for the role of Special advisers is that there is a very difficult translation that has 
to take place, like a linguistic translation between politics and policy and then back between 
policy and politics. Civil servants do not understand both the languages, and nor should they, are 
not politicians. So then the secretary of state would try and explain it, and then my job would be 
to go through in some detail that translation. I would say that most civil servants felt, I think,  that 
I was explaining what the secretary of state meant when he said x. The Secretary of state was 
always extremely busy and that was my job – my job, if I had a spare hour – was to ensure 
someone writing a submission really understood what the secretary of state wanted. Otherwise 
someone has done a lot of work on something and then it comes up and it’s completely wrong 
because they’ve not understood that translation. So I would spend lot of time doing this; they 
would say, ‘look I know you said he meant x, but he can’t really mean x can he?’ So then so I 
said, let’s talk about it again and then they said oh yes. Then I would have a lot of those sorts of 
meetings which would be when the submission was halfway done, talking to them about what he 
meant 
 6 
Another who worked in the Ministry of Defence even argued that his job was not political in this sense 
since  the MoD was a hard department to be political in, as the civil service wouldn’t accept it and nor 
would the army”.  
 
Our questionnaire asked whether SpAds have a general policy making role that extends simply beyond 
advising on "the politics" of a particular proposal in a question that asked whether they agreed their 
advice to ministers is "political" rather than "technical".  At first glance SpAds were rather split on 
whether there was such a division of labour:   55 per cent agreed and 45 per cent disagreed (N= 120). 
Not surprisingly, those SpAds who were less frequently engaged in shaping policy and more involved 
in communicating the message about what the government was doing to the outside world were 
significantly (p<0.01) more likely to agree (65 per cent of the 71 respondents spending a large part or 
all of their time on communication) than those spending much or all of their time developing policy (43 
per cent of  63 respondents) -- only one third of those more heavily involved in developing policy are 
likely to see their role as distinctive from the technical side of  civil service advice. 
 
In addition the work of SpAds does not appear to be limited to a few areas of departmental activity of 
special interest to the minister leaving much of the rest of the department to the traditional groups that 
helped ministers decide policy before the growth of the SpAd system.  Only 23 per cent of all SpAds 
said they “concentrated on a few projects” rather than on issues across the Department.  Those more 
involved in developing policy (33 per cent of those for whom “a large part” or more of their work was 
taken up with designing policies) were significantly (at p<.01 level) more likely to concentrate their 
attention on a narrow range of issues than those that spent less (10 per cent), indicating that a significant 
number of advisers were invited in to help on specific projects, but even so, the large majority of SpAds 
even among those developing policy,  ranged across the whole department. 
 
Given that a large proportion of SpAds see it as their role to become directly involved in helping shape 
policy across the whole department and in ways that are not clearly limited to giving “political” advice, 
there might be expected to exist a large potential for conflict between SpAds and civil servants.  
However, the perceptions of the relationship between SpAds and civil servants appear remarkably non-
conflictual, at least from the perspective of the SpAd. On the one hand, SpAds are evenly split as to 
whether they believe "civil servants tend to think SpAds have too much power",  with 51 per cent 
disagreeing and 49 per cent agreeing (N=120).  This did not vary significantly according to whether the 
respondent tended to spend more time on policy than communication.  However, this question assesses 
the potential for conflict, and on a more direct assessment of actual conflict the level of harmony 
appears even greater. We asked whether  the advice that they gave tended to agree with that of senior 
civil servants, 68 per cent (N=114) said they "tended to agree more often than not", 11 per cent that 
they disagreed,  20 per cent that they "advised on different things".  Contrary to what might be 
expected, those more involved in policy seemed to perceive less disagreement. The 21 officials tending 
to concentrate their attention to policy development (spending much or all their time on policy 
development and substantially less on other areas of activity) were the least likely to say there is any 
disagreement with civil servants (none of the 21 argued that they disagreed, a finding significant at the 
p<.05 level). 
 
The argument that there is relatively little apparent friction between SpAds and civil servants might 
appear somewhat odd in the light of the scandals that have brought some SpAds into front page 
headlines.  However, it is worth noting that many of these scandals did not involve policy development 
or even directly the civil service.  The 1999 Charlie Whelan resignation arose from the SpAd briefing 
against Peter Mandelson, a colleague of his boss, Gordon Brown. The scandals surrounding Jo Moore, 
whose alleged disposition to "bury bad news" on one occasion when the media were concerned with 
9/11 or another with the funeral of Princess Margaret, were more clearly conflicts between advisers and 
civil servants.  However, the relative infrequency of such conflicts, and the fact that in the Jo Moore 
cases this was essentially a conflict within a ministerial press office, mishandled spectacularly to the 
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extent that it led to a ministerial resignation and damage to a top civil servant's career, mean that it 
would be mistaken to see these as a sign of more widespread conflicts over policy making. 
 
We cannot say to what degree SpAd perceptions of harmony are endorsed by those of the civil servants 
they deal with.  However, the SpAd perceptions seem to be based on a belief that the fixer and 
commissar roles are closely interlinked.  In the interviews several mentioned the well-established point 
that  SpAds “take quite a lot of crap away from civil servants”  indicating the belief that civil servants 
find it useful or convenient to have people working in the department who are allowed to act politically 
and operate in areas that are either out of bounds or grey areas for officials.  Others mentioned the 
importance of SpAds as the route by which civil servants could find out what the minister was thinking, 
especially on matters of detail that would be hard to refer continually up to her or him.  Our 
questionnaire asked about this: 71 per cent agreed that “civil servants often find out the minister’s views 
from special advisers” and only 29 per cent disagreed (N=121), and those spending more time on policy 
were significantly (p<.01) level more likely (81 per cent) to believe this to be true than those less 
involved (58 per cent). 
 
It was to be expected that the interdependence between fixer and commissar roles might help explain 
the lack of evidence of conflict between officials and SpAds, with SpAds doing the jobs civil servants 
cannot or are reluctant to get involved in and compensate for difficulties with access to ministers caused 
by the time or attention span constraints from which ministers suffer.  Less expected was the SpAds 
own perception that their authority and power as commissars in the policy making system could also 
depend on the degree to which they could act as political fixers.  Several respondents referred to this 
interdependence in one way or another.  One referred to it through the parable of Ed Balls 
If  SpAds establish themselves has having the backing of the Secretary of State they can become 
very powerful – for instance Ed Balls …  ended up being Chief Executive of the Treasury. 
Because he could deal with the civil servants on a level that Brown could not manage, once the 
civil servants realised that his decisions were backed, he became very powerful 
Another pointed out  that  SpAds had influence with policy officials “only as far as they were doing 
what the minister wanted.  Power comes from the minister, and the special advisers were only powerful 
to the extent that they were carrying out the minister’s wishes”.  Yet another took this point further 
“power is totally derived from the Cabinet Minister. As a SpAd in general you are less of an individual 
in your own right as you become more of an extension of the Cabinet Minister ..  How good a SpAd 
you are depends entirely on the relationship you have with your minister and how aligned you are to his 
thoughts and decisions”.   
 
Good relations with the civil service came up in many of the interviews as the basis for effective 
commissar roles: 
Since SpAds work with Private Office a great deal, poor relations with them would undoubtedly 
be difficult. Poor relations would mean SpAds could not be invited to meetings and left out of 
circulation lists for important papers. Good relations with the Private Office were needed in order 
for SpAds to be successful, because fundamentally, the Private Office and SpAds have a shared 
agenda: to ensure the smooth running of the department, and to ensure that their Minister does the 
best that they can possibly do and delivers on all the things they want to do. 
And indeed there could be many occasions when the SpAd and the departmental civil servants could 
find themselves on the same side in any politico-administrative conflict.  For example, one argued that 
she successfully mobilised departmental officials to block a No 10 proposal to develop a White Paper 
that the minister concerned opposed.  Another suggested that  a “civil servant may seek the SpAd to 
help influence the minister if the civil servant is aware that the SpAd agrees with their viewpoint. 
Making sure that they are in agreement with the adviser  is the best way for a civil servant to ensure that 
their specific policy may reach the minister”.  Two SpAds described enlisting civil service support to 
try to dissuade a minister from doing something that they thought politically unwise. 
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Conclusions 
The balance between fixer and commissar among our New Labour SpAds appears from the evidence  to 
be rather even.  Our survey and questioning is admittedly limited.  It did not ask direct questions about 
relationships with the media since our concern was with more direct involvement with the policy 
making structures at the top of Whitehall, yet Spads exclusively concerned with “spin” and not at all 
with policy development appear to be, judging from our evidence, relatively few in number.  While 
“communication”, which includes spinning as well as political fixing, was the single most important 
consumer of the time of SpAds, few did this to the exclusion of other activities. Moreover, as one put it 
“advisers involved in specific areas of policy would need to understand how this policy was presented 
in the media, while advisers involved in a media role would also need a detailed grasp of policy”. 
 
The roles of fixer and commissar appear to be strongly interdependent in the specific context of SpAds 
in UK government in a way that one would not expect of political appointees in other systems, such as 
Germany and France.  In part this is because of SpAds’ lack of direct executive authority: their power  
is secondhand from the minister, and their abilities to help shape policy derive from their ability to 
speak for the minister and achieve what their minister wants them to achieve.  This makes the question 
of whether they are “too powerful”, the question that has dominated much public discussion about their 
role, less immediately relevant than one might think.  They are additional players that have distinct uses 
from the point of view of the minister and the civil servants with whom they interact, but not 
necessarily independent shapers of policy.  How the balance between fixer and commissar is struck 
depends upon the individual adviser as well as the minister for whom the SpAd works.  It might also be 
expected to reflect the political context – it is likely that our survey, had it been conducted among 
current SpAds (and we suspect our high response rate as resulted in part from the fact that we were 
asking people who were no longer in office) operating the intricate details of coalition politics, would 
have shown the fixer role to occupy more of their time. 
 
This relatively new layer between the minister and the civil service does not look, from the evidence 
derived from the SpAd point of view at least, to be a significant usurper of civil service power.  The 
power and authority that special advisers have appears to be closely linked to the relationship that each 
SpAd has with the minister.  The importance of this direct and personal relationship is not necessarily a 
characteristic of advisers in all jurisdictions, not even those where advisers have no direct executive 
authority of their own.  In Sweden, for instance, during periods of coalition government at least some 
advisers operate in ministries where the minister is not from their party but from that of a coalition 
partner, suggesting a stronger link between the adviser and party networks than such a direct and 
personal relationship with the minister (Pierre 2004).  The close link with the minister often places 
SpAds in the role of the diviner of the minister's mind.  Whether SpAds are accurate diviners of the 
minister's mind is impossible to tell.  Our evidence suggests that when asked how SpAds "mostly learn 
the minister's views", the most important route is through "informal meetings" (50 per cent) and their 
"general knowledge of the minister's views" (45 per cent) and far less frequently through formal 
meetings (13 per cent) and written instructions (10 per cent). Informal methods of learning ministers' 
wishes are not unique to SpAds as informality and anticipation appears to characterise the way civil 
servants do it too (Page and Jenkins 2005). It is likely that SpAds will have at least as good if not better 
idea of the minister's mind than the civil servants because they generally know them better and spend 
far more time with them. 
 
Yet despite the obvious advantages for democracy of having the political leadership better represented 
throughout the bureaucracy, a downside to the routinization and development of the role of the SpAd in 
British government comes into view when one considers one consequence of the creation of an 
additional layer between the minister and the civil servants.  In the somewhat different context of the 
growing ranks of political appointees in US agencies, Light (1995: 167) points to a "thickening" of 
government.  In comparison to the near doubling of the numbers of layers of upper reaches in  US 
executive hierarchies in 35 years, the addition of a thin sprinkling of political advisers to help UK 
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ministers appears a modest addition. However, taking away from the minister the everyday task of 
having to deal with a department, however faithfully the adviser might reflect his or her wishes, runs 
the risk that the notion of a "minsters wishes" becomes almost a counter factual hypothesis: if ministers 
had some idea about this or that issue what would they think?  If they do not have to deal with the level 
of detail and fine tuning that can only be resolved at a political level usually involved in putting 
together a policy, ministers will find it hard to develop wishes that shape such policies.  For an official 
putting together policies a quick reply from a SpAd certainly speeds up the policy making process; 
makes it easier even.  But it could take the minister further away from an understanding of how policies 
work.  A couple of SpAds apiece is not, of course, enough to change the basic structure of ministerial 
decision making.  However, with direct ministerial involvement in everyday policy decisions in British 
government being already quite slight (Page and Jenkins 2005), if they were to be associated with an 
even greater propensity for ministers to retreat from significant policy detail, the blessings of special 
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